Since the beginning of 2003, Chen Shui-bian has created several "incidents" involving cross-Straits relations designed to elicit pathos from the Taiwan public and incite their hatred for the mainland.
In April, when both sides were fighting the SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome) epidemic, the Taiwan authorities kept politicizing the virus outbreak to serve its own ends. Initially, it did not do enough in the way of prevention, gloating instead over its temporary "zero infection" rate. It also took the opportunity to try and refrain from the "one side, one country" concept by advocating membership in the World Health Organization (WHO), for which only sovereign nations are eligible.
In May, when Chen's efforts to attain WHO membership were thwarted, he pushed for a referendum scheduled for March 20, 2004, to cover such topics as nuclear power, an application to join the WHO and "congressional reform." By doing so, he went back on his own word and revealed his separatism machinations.
In June, when SARS was not effectively contained in Taiwan, Taiwan's request to declare the area free of the virus and remove it from the travel advisory list was not immediately granted by the WHO. Even though this was part of the normal procedure, Chen distorted the facts and misled the public by blaming the mainland for blocking the way.
In July, Chen's administration used Article 23 of the Basic Law of the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to distort and disparage the "one country, two systems" policy. In August, Chen's administration changed gear to focus on the issue of direct flights. On August 13, Chen put forward a "three-stage timetable": to expedite cargo transport by the end of the year, including point-to-point direct flights of charter and cargo planes, as well as customs clearance, a process started in 1997; direct flight negotiations to begin after the 2004 Taiwan election; and the opening of direct flights by the end of 2004.
However, for the Taiwan authorities, the "bottom line" for the direct transportation links is "Taiwan is a sovereign independent nation."
On August 15, Taiwan's "executive yuan" unveiled an "assessment report on cross-Straits direct flights." Although the report acknowledged, to an extent, the positive impact direct flights would have on Taiwan's economy, it exaggerated the negative effects on Taiwan's politics, society, economy and, in particular, security. By highlighting political divisions, the "intransigence of sovereignty" and the "one side, one country" concept, the report seemed to be more against direct flights than in favour of it.
In September, the Taiwan authorities renewed its long-standing efforts to gain United Nations (UN) membership, creating an impression of "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan" in the international community. At its instigation, UN delegates from Gambia, Nicaragua and Tuvalu filed a petition for the UN representation of the Republic of China (Taiwan) and asked that it be placed on the agenda of the 58th General Assembly. This marked the 11th consecutive attempt by the Taiwan administration to get into the UN. Compared with past endeavours, this year's effort was echoed by island separatism activities, such as the demand for "the change of Taiwan's name."
In the first two years of his reign, Chen has maintained his separatism stand and rejected the one-China principle. He has promoted "gradual independence" but, from time to time, has assumed a facade of "sincerity" and "good will" for improving the cross-Straits relationship. Never has he been as blatant as this year in incessantly provoking trouble.
So why this year? The answer is simple.
The "presidential" election will be held in March, so this is the campaign year.
Chen's top priority is to get votes to maintain his position. According to reports, the Chen administration has concluded that the key to victory is to incite the mainland during the campaign process so that any overreaction by the mainland can be used to attack political opponents in a wave of anti-mainland sentiment. This intention is obvious.
With half a year to go before the election, Chen's administration will undoubtedly play more of the same game and even add more fuel to the fire.
For example, he may make a great deal of the APEC conference, scheduled for late October and early November.
Chen will stay in the United States during his visit to South America at the end of this year.
He may use his transit in the United States to stage more separatism attempts. And the March referendum will be another chance for provocation. If it is a close race, Chen may even decide to create something bigger to achieve his purpose.
In light of this, people on both sides of the Taiwan Straits need to be vigilant and watch Chen's actions carefully.
Safeguarding the stability of cross-Straits relations requires a concentrated effort.
The author is a Beijing-based political commentator.
